the Italian filmmakers associated with Italian neo-realism, especially Roberto Rossellini and Luchino Visconti. In 1957, he was given the opportunity to direct a film called Camping, "about the adventures of two young lovers on motorcycles" (Zeffirelli 1986, 140) , and, as with many of his future films, this proved popular with audiences but was damned by critics. Following a near ten year hiatus, Zeffirelli became an international sensation with his two Shakespeare adaptations, The Taming of the Shrew (1967) and Romeo and Juliet (1968) . The former, starring Elizabeth Taylor and Richard Burton, was a particularly popular success (Zeffirelli, 224) , as was Romeo and Juliet, which was nominated for a number of Oscars in 1969, including for best film and best director.
However, Zeffirelli was involved in a serious car crash on 17 January 1969 (Zeffirelli, 232) which precluded him from helping with the promotion of the film which, according to him, resulted in Romeo and Juliet only winning awards for costumes and cinematography at the Academy Awards. In his eyes, this "was a setback, as that year had really established me as an international film director" (Zeffirelli, 240). Nevertheless, Paramount, which had distributed the film in the United States, were happy to offer him an "excellent five-year film contract" (Zeffirelli, 240) which allowed him to propose filming a life of the medieval Catholic saint, Francis of Assisi (b. 1182 Assisi (b. -d. 1226 ).
While it is clear that Zeffirelli's turn to such an overt religious subject was in part due to his personal experience of a near-fatal accident and encroaching middle-age (cf. Zeffirelli, 246), he was nevertheless very aware of the political echoes of the story of a rich young man who decides to cast off his material possessions and live a simple life close to nature. Zeffirelli explains:
The tale was simple enough, though clearly the emphasis would be on its contemporary relevance. St Francis was a holy revolutionary: his concept of a non-violent, pacific reversal of the greed and laziness that he felt had crept into the church and indeed the world of his day was obviously akin to the spirit of the 1960s. If peace and love was the slogan of the decade then here was a story to match it. (Zeffirelli, (240) (241) Brother Sun, Sister Moon takes its title from the single piece of extant writing attributed to Francis, his "Canticle of the Sun" written in Umbrian dialect rather than the more usual Latin (see Robert Steele's translation in "The Mirror of Perfection" 1910, 294-295) , in which Francis famously praises God for the elements of the natural world:
Be Thou praised, my Lord, with all Thy creatures, above all Brother Sun, who gives the day and lightens us therewith.
[…]
Be Thou praised, my Lord, of Sister Moon and the stars, in the heaven has Thou formed them, clear and precious and comely.
Zeffirelli's reversion to a fairly direct experience of faith ("If, before, I had often considered that the role of destiny was important in my life, now I began to reinterpret this as providence, as if there was a guiding hand directing my decisions" [Zeffirelli 1986, 246: The director therefore absolutely believes, but still acts in a way contrary to the apparent implications of that belief. Zeffirelli draws comfort from the consideration that, according to Catholic doctrine, such "sins of the flesh" are not "mortal sins" (241), and are therefore subject to forgiveness via confession.
Such theological sophistry is gently humorous in Zeffirelli's account,t but it is important that the rediscovery of his religious faith is couched in emotional terms, rather than expressed through doctrinal adherence. We might say that Zeffirelli rediscovers belief, rather than religion. Belief, then, is an experience in and of itself and, following his car crash, Zeffirelli finds belief, not God. This particular structure of thinking about belief can be found in Brother Sun, Sister
Moon.
Brother Sun, Sister Moon
Taking seriously the insight that the story of St Francis reflected in some way the zeitgeist of the late 1960s, Zeffirelli first approached the Beatles to appear as monks in the film, and in his typically insouciant name-dropping style, explains: I suppose at a human level I found Ringo the most open and friendly, but I soon saw that to get anywhere you had first to convince Paul of an idea, and then get John to deal with the practical problems. I managed eventually to get that far, but as soon as John and I began to work out a schedule, it was instantly clear how impossible the whole thing was. (Zeffirelli 1986, 241) Before eventually settling on unknowns Judi Bowker and Graham
Faulkner for the roles of Clare and Francis, Zeffirelli considered Al Pacino (who apparently passed on the screen test to Francis Ford Coppola for The Godfather) and Isabella Rossellini, and this imaginary film, including the Beatles, must surely be one of the great never-realised projects in cinema history. Nevertheless, Brother Sun, Sister Moon presents an emotionally innocent, if not naive, experience; that, according to Zeffirelli, was one of the reasons that the film was so derided critically outside of Italy:
As 1971 began and the film took shape, I started to have niggling doubts about what would become of it. Watching the various scenes cut together, I realised just how much the film was rooted in the 1960s, yet now that the 1970s were unfolding it was clear that a massive change had taken place. Young people were no longer espousing peace and love; they were out on the streets protesting against the Vietnam War, throwing bricks, burning draft cards and fighting with the police. Since the events in Paris in 1968 a creeping mood of anger and violence had spread through the major cities. Brother Sun began to look almost naïve in the face of such cynicism. (Zeffirelli 1986, 256-257) The film opened in New York in 1972 and was met with "mocking laughter at the idea of love and gentleness" (265) while its Easter 1973 release in London was "greeted with no more enthusiasm, though with less derision" (266). While critically disastrous, the film has gone on to become a perennial success, especially with religious believers (267). 1 Zeffirelli's unabashed sentimentality has often been criticised but he is astute in recognizing the contradiction between popular acceptance and political savaging. Speaking of the "sentimental horror," The Champ (1979), Zeffirelli complained: "Once again I was confronted by the ludicrous contradiction that the radical tradition ought to be a popular one and yet, if one tries to create a work for the mass audience which honestly appeals to their best instincts, the Leftists, of all people, can't resist the temptation to be snobbish about such a work". (Zeffirelli 1986, 308) It is this appeal to the emotional that Zeffirelli sees at the core of cinema itself. He writes early on in his memoirs, "I am still very vulnerable to cinema; even today I laugh and cry openly and believe quite passionately in what is taking place on screen" (Zeffirelli 1986, 15: my emphasis) . The cinema is a place of belief, and that belief is a passionate emotional experience. Brother Sun, Sister Moon is a film that celebrates emotion, and is unabashed in wearing this sentimentality on its sleeve. "postwar Europe was rapidly losing the spiritual values that had brought it through the terrors of war, and it is his urge to resuscitate this lost faith that accounts for the strong religious strain of the films of this period" (Brunette 1987, 96) .
The Life of St Francis in Cinema
Crucially, for the argument developed in this article, Brunette says that, "for Rossellini the mere existence of faith is finally more important than its object" (Brunette, 96). Thus Rossellini "unashamedly offers Saint Francis and his philosophy as answers, as a way back to an essential wholeness" (Brunette, 131) , and this wholeness is one predicated on faith, but not on belief in a specific theological doctrine. This faith, as we will see in our discussion of Critchley, is really a faith in the possibility of a future, rather than in any sort of divinity. This problem of taste and reaction is difficult to police, but an audience could, and perhaps should, react to the film on that film's own terms. We should try to eradicate the ironic distance that would make us think of 1970s shampoo adverts; rather, we should understand and experience these images as if they were being offered to us in good faith. Clare is beautiful, and nature is wonderful and it is, as Donovan sings, a "lovely day". The film asks us to believe in its sentimental depiction of the world, and if we are able to react with the proper emotional force, then, and only then, will we experience the film fully, and feel the belief that is the core emotion of the religious world depicted in Brother Sun, Sister Moon.
Sequences throughout the film ask audiences to believe in the unbelievable. Francis is both beautiful and good. Animals trust him, as do humans. The Umbrian countryside is gorgeous, in a way that seems impossible. The film gives us an awe inspiring vision of the world of medieval Italy, and only if the spectator succumbs to this emotional blackmail can one truly experience the film as a film. We still know that this is a fiction (and a quite implausible one at that), but, nevertheless, we can experience the emotion of believing that such a world is possible. This is what I call false emotion, or quasi-emotion, without any negative connotations. Just because my emotion is "false" does not mean that I do not truly experience it. This is the paradox of fiction.
The Paradox of Fiction
Cinema is often discussed in terms of its emotional effects. Because of the (supposed) close analogy between film and the structure of consciousness, it is considered to be a privileged medium, uniquely able to elicit emotions (Plantinga 2009, 48-49 In his first solution, Radford imagines that we might simply forget that we are watching a fiction, and dismisses this as infantile. In the second, we "suspend our disbelief " (Radford, 71), but he finds that such suspension would never be sufficiently total to be of help. Thirdly, he considers the possibility that such responses may be a "brute fact of human nature" (Radford, 72) but that others, who do not enjoy fictions, are not moved in such ways. He denies that this is not a universal experience, since everyone reacts to lies or other misapprehensions.
In the fourth solution, we call up possibilities in our mind and react emotionally to these imaginings, but this is too close to original problem. Something like quasi-belief? I q-believe the fiction (which we might call a q-reality) and then experience q-emotions. The problem here is that we now have two completely different systems: belief, reality, emotion on the one side, and running independently across the way, q-belief, q-reality and q-emotion. It seems unlikely that we would have such similar processes that are necessarily unrelated to each other. If they are related, the problem then is to explain the nature of this relationship.
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The solution might be to reverse the order of the hierarchy that Radford implicitly sets up. Instead of imagining that our real emotions respond to reality in some sort of innate way (underpinned by our belief, which is really a knowledge, in and of that reality), we could imagine that we learn to respond emotionally to situations through our understanding of various narratives about the way in which humans respond to the world. This line of thought undermines any sense of natural emotions and proposes that our reactions to the real world (r-world) are based on our experience and knowledge of the q-world, the world of fiction and imagination.
The strength of this position is that it does not lock us into an essentialism around emotion -there are no necessary and predetermined natural emotional responses and this would allow us to account for culturally different emotions, or emotions that have historically fallen away or might fall away in the future. It also accounts for the way in which different people react to different fictions and to different real situations. Since there is no natural emotional reaction, our emotional responses are the result of a complex personal and cultural history that is probably more susceptible to psychoanalytic explanation than to any sort of emotional cognitivism. The primacy of q-emotion gives us the freedom to respond to the world without the tyranny of pre-ordination and also to know that our emotions are subject to change. However, I am probably now entering the field of experimental psychology with such claims and I will stick to arguing that it is fiction that allows us to understand our emotions and even to have them in the first place.
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Belief and Faith as Emotions
In the paradox of fiction, belief is the foundation on which the structure of the problem exists. It is true that religious life cannot reach a certain degree of intensity without involving a psychic exaltation that is in some way akin to delirium. For this reason prophets, founders of religions, great saints-men with an unusually sensitive religious consciousness -very often show signs of excessive and even pathological excitability. (Durkheim 1912, 171) If faith is understood as a form of religious ecstasy, then it seems quite uncontroversial to argue that faith is an emotion rather than a reasoned position. In a paper from around the same time as Durkheim's book, A. C.
Armstrong made the argument that it is incorrect to assimilate "religious consciousness" entirely with emotion, since religious thought "contains cognitive as well as emotional (and volitional) elements. The affective factors depend upon the cognitive, and vary with them" (Armstrong 1911, 75) .
Armstrong is keen to defend the rational basis of religion, admitting that faith is indeed a form of feeling, while (following William James) contending that emotion "is not mere feeling; […] it is feeling related to ideas" (Armstrong, 74). Such a claim for a certain modernity in contemporary religion accepts that in "its beginnings the religious feeling no doubt manifested itself in the simpler and less developed forms of the affective life" (Armstrong, 72), but that such "primitive" phases have been, or ought to be, superseded.
Armstrong is wary of the chaos that a complete assimilation of religious faith to sentiment might bring about and so concludes that, "Religious faith includes elements of knowledge and of feeling" (Armstrong, 79), with the belief that it is knowledge that keeps the excesses of feeling at bay. in its use of soft-focus cinematography, close-ups of emotionally charged faces, panoramic shots of nature, and mawkish music. It attempts to instill in its viewer an emotional experience that will in some way act as a proxy for the "state of ecstasy" felt by Francis. Thus, even if one does not really believe in an omnipresent God, one is able to feel that belief in the experience of watching a film that creates such a similar emotion in the spectator. This is the experience of the quale of a belief, without necessarily having that belief as such.
Sigmund Freud presents similar ideas in "The

Belief without Belief at the Cinema
It is at this point that we might return to Derrida's thought at the beginning of this article that, "At the movies, you believe without believing, but this believing without believing remains a believing" (Derrida, 27).
Samuel Weber identifies two implications here:
If I understand the interview, the specific link between "believing without believing" and cinema implies (1) specters and (2) the déliaison that separates one not just from others in the immediate vicinity but from oneself, especially insofar as this Self is habitually, routinely constituted-i.e. through repetition of the Same qua Identical. (Weber and Kamuf 2015, 152) .
Weber highlights the internal differentiation of the supposedly present subject that is figured by the metaphor of the ghost. The subject both is and is not itself. Weber is also careful not to put too much emphasis on the singularity of cinema here. He says that, "Without ceasing to be committed to such a Self, one 'believes' oneself projected into a spectral reality that is cut off from the world of habitual identity" (Weber and Kamuf, 153). In other words, the spectator's belief that he or she is a self-identical subject persists, even when that spectator understands this identity to be an illusion.
However, Weber says, "This is supposed to be distinctive of cinema. But once again, this does not seem to be exclusive to cinema" (Weber and Kamuf, 153). However, this does not in itself mean that we should not pay attention to cinema and its specificities.
Weber also moves the analysis of belief to intersect with emotion, by substituting "feeling" for "believing". He tentatively says, "I think what I want to suggest by this substitution is that the experience of believing without believing is experienced through feelings, which paradoxically supplement the lack of actual physical contact in the relation to film" (Weber and Kamuf, 154). Weber defines "belief without belief " as an emotion, a feeling, and so gives us a way of understanding this self-cancelling formulation in a less gnomic fashion. If "belief without belief " is, in fact, a felt emotion, this asks us to explore the issue of emotional response in more detail. Weber concludes that the "way 'belief ' is solicited in and by cinema reveals its dependence on both desire and feelings, such as anxiety, which is the feeling that seeks to overcome and control the heterogeneity of feeling itself " (Weber and Kamuf, 154). Anxiety, then, becomes the central emotion in our experience of the fetishistic disavowal at the centre of the cinematic experience and this accords very neatly with Freud's formulation (although Freud does note that fetishists in general are quite happy). 10 The believer-without-belief, like the fetishist, knows very well that there is no God, but nevertheless feels as if there is indeed a God.
Frank Jackson explains that there is something that he calls the qualia of experience, those things that cannot be accounted for by a physicalist QB is non-intentional -I can experience belief without having a specific belief about anything in the world. QB is therefore something like a mood rather than an emotion (which would require an intentional object).
We could also imagine a zombie worshipper, enacting the rituals without feeling any of the "belief ", but nevertheless acting as if there were an omnipotent deity who took an interest in human affairs. Such an adherent would have neither QB nor CB, only the outward appearance of belief (presumably it would be impossible to have CB without QB). We could call this sort of hypocrisy "Ritual Belief " (RitB): when I do not believe in the content of the belief, I do not experience it, but I follow its rituals and strictures since I understand that this is the way in which human societies provide a structure for consensus and group action (we could also call this Mythic Belief, or even Freudian belief). I don't believe in the gods of the Italians, but, since I live among the Italians in the medieval period, I
understand that this way of acting collectively provides an important social structure and may be the best way for me to achieve personal comfort and We now have three possible types of belief: r-belief (real belief), q-belief (quasi-belief) and rit-belief (ritual belief). R-belief, while apparently prior to the other two forms and possibly foundational for q-belief, suffers from the problem of origin. Where does it come from? How does someone suddenly come to the indisputable knowledge that an unfalsifiable proposition is true?
How does Francs come to the understanding that God is real and speaking directly to him? Discounting the possibility that God (as an omnipresent, omniscient and omnibenevolent being), has some sort of real existence in the world, Francis must experience belief as an overwhelming emotional state that does not require the real existence of God since his experience is of that faith and not of that God (pace Curtiz's divine voice). In this sense, Francis's belief must, in the first place, be a q-belief. He feels the belief just as I feel it when I watch Brother Sun, Sister Moon. But then, in some way,
Francesco is able to derail his experience and move from off-line belief to on-line belief. We might then need to distinguish between belief, irrational belief and insanity, distinctions that Brother Sun, Sister Moon also explores.
Approaching the issue from the opposite, secular side of things, Simon
Critchley addresses the problem of faith with the question: "Is politics conceivable without religion?" and argues that it is not (Critchley 2012, 24) .
He sees belief as the central issue here. He asks: "So, can a political collectivity maintain itself in existence, that is, maintain its unity and identity without a moment of the sacred, without religion, rituals, and something that we can only call belief?" (Critchley, 24). The argument is that a particular community needs to believe in its status as a collective community, in order for individuals to act in ways beneficial to the survival and stability of that community which may, in the short term, be deleterious I do not claim that the fictional world exists in the same ontological sense as the everyday world, but rather that our emotional response to reality, as commonly understood, and to fiction are not necessarily different.
This does not mean that we cannot tell the difference between reality and fiction, but that our experience of emotion does not make such a difference and, more strongly, that our emotions are, for the most part, learned from fictional narratives.
The thought that our real emotions about real people in our real lives are not necessarily more complex or heartfelt than those experienced fictionally may strike readers as counter-intuitive. However, I wish to argue that, if we seriously try to experience our emotions in a phenomenological manner, then we might have to admit that there are certain emotions that are far more nuanced in our fictional lives than they are in our real lives. In fact, I would go further and say that there cannot be a strict distinction, on an emotional level, between reality and fiction. When I fall in love with the handsome scriptwriter and his unconvincing moustache, is this a stronger experience than the one I feel when I empathise with a fictional character doing the same? Maybe I will never fall in love, or perhaps there is no such experience as "falling in love" in the real world, and that what we call "love" is merely a product of expectations learned from fictions. I use the word "merely" in the previous sentence ironically, since the upshot of my argument is that all of our emotions are learned from fictions.
This argument is not falsifiable, in a strictly scientific sense. 
David Sorfa Notes
See Koslovic (2002, 2) for an overview of the critical reception of the film. For fuller discussions of Francis, God's Jester, see Brunette (1987 , 128-137), Millen (2000 and Bandy (2003, 71-74) .
There is an important strand in film theory and film-philosophy, which takes the problem of belief and cinema as its object and is concerned specifically with film's relationship to the real world, usually, but not always, from a Heideggerian perspective. Siegfried Kracauer argues that film offers a "redemption of physical reality" by which I understand him to mean that film is able to reinvest a corrupted world with hope (Kracauer 1960). In the 1940s and 50s, André Bazin wrote extensively on the relationship between reality and cinema and Robert Sinnerbrink excavates the way in which Bazin understood the photographic nature of cinema as underpinning a belief that the image "bears the trace of a former presence" (Sinnerbrink 2012a, 97; see also Rushton 2011, 42-78) . Stanley Cavell similarly uses cinema as a means for providing a proof against scepticism since if the world can be photographed and filmed this must then mean that the world does indeed exist (Cavell, 1979) . In this tradition, cinema allows the spectator to believe in the world which, since it is so awful and unbelievable, requires the countersignature of film to convince us of its worth. Cinema, then, is the miracle that proves the existence of the world. Berys Gaut has recently developed this argument in terms of an appreciation of the technological achievement necessary for creating cinematic artworks. While he argues for the validity of considering digital effects as part of a film's achievement, he is also impressed by Tom Cruise performing his own stunts in Mission: Impossible -Ghost Protocol (2011) . Gaut concludes that, "Appreciating a cinematic artwork depends in part on understanding the technology it incorporates" (Gaut 2016, 13) and this is in fact an argument for appreciating the manipulation of the real world in real ways, whether that be through the skill needed to manipulate technological effects to create a visually perceptible and spectacular image or through the acting talent or foolhardiness of an actor. Dan Shaw gives a very useful overview of the developments in mirror neuron theory that argues that our brains simulate the emotions perceived in others: "The discovery of the existence and emotive functions of mirror neurons confirms that we simulate other people's emotions in a variety of ways, even in cinematic contexts. This is made possible by these components of the human brain firing identically when we observe others engaged in an activity (or exhibiting a facial expression or body language) and when we do so ourselves" (Shaw 2016, 148) . This hypothesis would, I think, support my general claim that there is no substantive difference between "real" and "fictional" emotions. Noël Carroll's view is that the value of a film can only be judged by the quality of our emotional response to it. If we laugh at a comedy and feel fear during a horror film, then that film has been successful and can be evaluated as such (Carroll 2003) . Gregor Currie has proposed the "simulation argument" in which we are able to "run" our emotions in an "off-line" mode when engaging with fictions. Currie says that, "these beliefs and desires, let uscall them pretend or imaginary beliefs and desires, differ from my own real beliefs and desires not just in being temporary and cancellable. They are also, unlike my real beliefs and desires, run 'off-line', disconnected from their normal perceptual inputs and behavioural outputs" (Currie 1995, 253) . The distinction I make between real beliefs (r-beliefs) and q-beliefs is very similar to this conception. Currie also warns that it is possible for such off-line emotions to go on-line and that if, "imagining alien values carried with it the possibility that we may actually come to have those values through failure of inhibition, such imaginings expose us and those around us to a real danger, though one we have scarcely begun to quantify" (Currie, 259). Anecdotally, some have worried that my engagement with belief and faith in Brother Sun, Sister Moon and in this article, might turn me into a believing Christian. See also Berys Gaut on the simulation argument (Gaut 2010, 148-150) . I am aware that there is an issue here if we consider creatures that apparently do not have fictional worlds in their ontology. However, it seems to me clear that animals can imagine the future in one way or another and so, on this minimal definition, I would hold that animals are just as much
